Let E be a public-key encryption system and let (pk i , sk i ) be public/private key pairs for E for i = 0, . . . , n. A natural question is whether E remains secure once an adversary obtains an encryption cycle, which consists of the encryption of sk i under pk (i mod n)+1 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Surprisingly, even strong notions of security such as chosen-ciphertext security appear to be insufficient for proving security in these settings. Since encryption cycles come up naturally in several applications, it is desirable to construct systems that remain secure in the presence of such cycles. Until now, all known constructions have only be proved secure in the random oracle model.
Introduction
Over the past two decades, significant work has gone into defining and attaining secure encryption. For symmetric encryption, the standard notion of security is called authenticated encryption [4, 18, 5, 19] , while for public-key encryption, security typically means semantic security under a chosenciphertext attack [21, 11] . These concepts, however, do not imply security for a common use case called Key-Dependent Messages (KDM).
A simple example of KDM comes up when an encryption system is used to encrypt its own private key. Let (pk, sk) be a public/private key pair and let c be the result of encrypting the message sk with the public key pk. It is straightforward to construct a chosen-ciphertext-secure encryption scheme that becomes completely insecure once c is given to the adversary [6] . Therefore, stronger notions of security and new constructions are needed if one is to encrypt messages that depend on the secret key. The dangers of KDM were already noted by Goldwasser and Micali [13] .
Key-dependent messages arise naturally in a number of real-world settings, often due to careless key management. For example, a backup system may store the backup encryption key on disk and then encrypt the entire disk, including the key, and backup the result. Another example is the BitLocker disk encryption utility (used in Windows Vista) where the disk encryption key can end up on disk and be encrypted along with the disk contents. A third example is a peer-to-peer storage system [7, Section 2.3] that generates a file encryption key from a hash of the file contents. In all these examples, the adversary obtains the encryption of a message that depends on the secret key. Generally speaking, KDM is not viewed as a security threat, and consequently, deployed systems make little effort to prevent it.
To address this gap between theory and practice, Black et al. [6] defined models of KDM security in both the symmetric and public-key settings. In their public-key model the adversary is given public keys pk 1 , . . . , pk n and can access an oracle O that returns the encryption of g(sk 1 , . . . , sk n ) under pk i for any polynomial-time function g and any index 1 ≤ i ≤ n of the adversary's choosing. For example, the adversary can request the encryption of sk i under pk j for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. The system is KDM-secure if the adversary cannot distinguish the oracle O from an oracle that always returns an encryption of 0. We provide a more formal description in the next section.
While Black et al. [6] construct KDM-secure encryption schemes in the random oracle model, no construction is known in the standard model (that is, without random oracles). Some initial steps towards constructions in the standard model are given in [14, Section 6.3] and [17] . Recently, Halevi and Krawczyk [14] extended the notion of KDM encryption to other cryptographic primitives such as PRFs.
The Black et al. model is very general and allows for encryption of an arbitrary function of the secret keys. A weaker notion of KDM called circular security was proposed by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [9] . Circular security is concerned primarily with encryption cycles, namely sequences of n ciphertexts (c 1 , . . . , c n ) where c i is the encryption of sk i under key pk (i mod n)+1 . More generally, one can consider an encryption clique in which sk i is encrypted under pk j for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. A system where an n × n encryption clique is indistinguishable from an appropriate n × n matrix of encryptions of 0 is said to be n-circular-secure. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya constructed a circular-secure public-key system in the random oracle model and used it in an elegant credentials system. Until now, nothing was known about n-circular-secure encryption without random oracles for n > 1. For the special case n = 1, there is a simple black-box construction from semantically secure public-key encryption 1 . This construction, however, does not help for n > 1.
Encryption cliques come up naturally in the BitLocker system when it is used to encrypt multiple disk partitions [12] . Let n be the number of disk partitions and say that partition i is encrypted using key k i . BitLocker enables the system to boot from any partition, and after boot-up certain other partitions should be accessible (BitLocker enables the administrator to specify an accesscontrol matrix that states, for each i, which partitions are accessible after boot from partition i). The BitLocker solution, which seems quite natural, is to store in partition i the keys k j for j = i encrypted under key k i . This way, when any partition boots, the system obtains access to other partitions. Clearly, this setup can result in an encryption clique (or a sub-graph of the clique).
Our results
Our main result is a public-key system that is circular-secure in the standard model under the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption. The difficulty in constructing such a system is the simulation of an encryption clique without knowledge of any of the secret keys. We demonstrate a system which is sufficiently homomorphic that such a clique can be constructed directly.
In fact, we prove a slightly stronger result by showing that our system is KDM-secure in the Black et al. [6] model, when the adversary is restricted to affine functions g. This enables the adversary to obtain encryption cliques, as well as encryptions of more complicated functions of the secret keys, without compromising security.
In Appendix A we study the fundamental question of whether standard security notions imply n-circular security for n > 1. It is well understood that existing proof techniques cannot prove that a semantically-secure system remains secure in the presence of encryption cycles. One may wonder whether this is a limitation of our proof techniques, or whether the implication is false. For n = 1 the implication is known to be false via a simple counterexample [6] . For n > 1 there is no known counterexample, which would be a semantically secure system that becomes insecure once an ncycle of encryptions is published. We construct a 2-cycle counterexample for one-way encryption -the system is a secure one-way encryption scheme, but becomes insecure as soon as a 2-cycle is published. We leave the question of constructing a semantically secure 2-cycle counterexample as a fascinating open problem.
Other related work. We note that the gap between the "black-box" model of encryption and the formal security models in cryptography has attracted considerable attention in the formal methods community [1, 2, 3, 20] .
KDM security: definitions and properties
We begin by reviewing Black et al.'s [6] definition of Key-Dependent Message security (KDM) in the public-key setting. We present a small extension of the definition, used also in [14] , that enables us to restrict the adversary to a particular set of functions.
A public-key encryption system E consists of three algorithms (G, E, D) where G is a keygeneration algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a public/private key pair (pk, sk); E(pk, m) encrypts message m with public key pk; and D(sk, c) decrypts ciphertext c with secret key sk.
We will use S λ to denote the space of secret keys output by G(λ). We use M λ to denote the common plaintext space for public keys output by G(λ). Throughout the paper we assume that S λ ⊆ M λ so that any secret key sk can be encrypted using any public key pk . Moreover, we assume that M λ is a finite subset of {0, 1} * . When λ is clear from context we will drop the subscript.
2.1 KDM security with respect to a set of functions C Informally, KDM security implies that the adversary cannot distinguish the encryption of a keydependent message from an encryption of 0. We define key-dependence relative to a fixed set of functions C. Let n > 0 be an integer and let C be a finite set of functions C := {f : S n → M }. For each function f ∈ C we require that |f (z)| is the same for all inputs z ∈ S n (i.e. the output length is independent of the input).
We define KDM security with respect to C using the following game that takes place between a challenger and an adversary A. For an integer n > 0 and a security parameter λ the game proceeds as follows:
init. The challenger chooses a random bit b R ← {0, 1}. It generates (pk 1 , sk 1 ), . . . , (pk n , sk n ) by running G(λ) n times, and sends (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) to A. queries. The adversary repeatedly issues queries where each query is of the form (i, f ) with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and f ∈ C. The challenger responds by setting
and sends c to A. finish. Finally, the adversary outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
We say that A is a C-KDM adversary and that A wins the game if b = b . Let W be the event that A wins the game and define A's advantage as
Definition 1. We say that a public-key encryption scheme E is n-way KDM-secure with respect to
is a negligible function of λ for any adversary A that runs in expected polynomial time in λ.
Non-trivial function classes. We are primarily interested in function classes C that imply that the public-key system E is circular secure. To this end, we say that a function class C := {f :
• all |M | constant functions f : S n → M (recall that a constant function maps all inputs in S n to some constant c ∈ M ), and
It is easy to see that KDM-security with respect to a non-trivial function class implies standard semantic security, since the constant functions enable the adversary to obtain the encryption of any message of its choice. The selector functions imply circular security since they enable the adversary to obtain E(pk i , sk j ) for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
The main result in this paper is a public-key system that is KDM-secure relative to a non-trivial function class. The discussion in the previous paragraph shows that the system is circular-secure.
Decision Diffie-Hellman
Let G be a group of prime order q. We let P DDH be the distribution (g, g x , g y , g xy ) in G 4 where g is a random generator of G and x, y are uniform in Z q . We let R DDH be the distribution (g, g x , g y , g z ), where g is a random generator of G and x, y, z are uniform in Z q subject to z = xy. A DDH adversary A takes as input a tuple (g, h, u, v) in G 4 and outputs 0 or 1. Define
Informally, we say that DDH holds in G if DDH Adv[A, G] is negligible for all efficient A.
A circular-secure encryption scheme
We build a circular-secure encryption system (for any n) based on the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. Let G be a group of prime order q and g a fixed generator of G. The size of G is determined by a security parameter λ. In particular, 1/q is a negligible function of λ.
The public-key encryption system E:
• Key Generation. Let := 3 log 2 q . Choose random g 1 , . . . , g in G and a random vector
1 · · · g s and define the public and private keys to be pk := (g 1 , . . . , g , h) and sk := (g
Note that the secret key sk is a random vector s in {0, 1} encoded as a vector of group elements.
• Encryption. To encrypt a group element m ∈ G, choose a random r 
It is easy to verify that the system is correct, that is, the decryption algorithm decrypts properly constructed ciphertexts. The system is a generalization of the ElGamal system where the secret key is a bit vector rather than an element in Z q .
Discussion and outline of the security proof
Proving that the system is circular secure is somewhat involved. Before proving security, we give some intuition for the construction and its proof. First, consider the basic ElGamal system. The public key is a pair (g, g x ) ∈ G 2 and the secret key is x ∈ Z q . A 1-cycle for this system, namely E(pk, sk), is a ciphertext (g r , e(x) · g rx ) where e(·) is some invertible encoding function mapping Z q to G. To prove 1-circular security we would need to show that the 4-tuple
is indistinguishable from a random 4-tuple in G 4 , but this is unlikely to follow from DDH. It is tempting to define the secret key as sk := v x (for some generator v), in which case the 1-cycle becomes (g r , v x · g rx ). The resulting system can be shown to be 1-circular secure under DDH. Unfortunately, the system does not work since one cannot decrypt ElGamal ciphertexts using the key sk = v x .
As a compromise between these two extremes, we pick the secret key as an -bit vector s R ← {0, 1} and store the key as sk := (g s 1 , . . . , g s ). We decrypt using sk by going back to the bit-vector representation. The challenge is to prove n-circular security from the DDH assumption.
Proof outline. Although our proof is not structured this way, it is instructive to first prove that the system E is 1-circular secure. We do so by first moving to an expanded system E 1 that has the same circular properties as E. For the system E 1 anyone can construct a perfectly valid 1-cycle. This will enable us to prove 1-circular security of E 1 (and also of E) from DDH. The reduction to DDH requires that the element h in the public key be uniform in G, given all the other elements in the public key. We use the left-over-hash lemma to prove uniformity of h using the entropy in the secret key s (see Corollary 4) .
Next, to prove n-circular security of E we use another property of the system: the system is homomorphic with respect to both the plaintext and secret key. In particular, anyone can transform an encryption of m under pk into an encryption of m under pk given only s ⊕ s , where s, s are secret keys for pk, pk respectively.
We use the secret-key homomorphism to deduce n-circular security from 1-circular security. Given a 1-cycle E(pk, sk) -which we readily have for E 1 -our simulator can construct encryptions E(pk , sk) for various pk . Doing so for n public keys provides the simulator with an encryption clique that it can give the adversary. This is used in Game 1 of Theorem 6. Overall, we prove n-circular security from DDH, for any n.
Proof of circular-security
We now prove that the system E provides circular security. We will prove a slightly stronger statement, namely that E is KDM-secure with respect to the set of affine functions, which is clearly non-trivial (i.e. contains all the constant and selector functions).
Affine functions. The set of affine functions acting on S n is defined as follows. Let sk 1 , . . . , sk n be n secret keys generated by G. Let s be the vector in G n obtained by concatenating these n secret keys. Now, let U = (u i,j ) be a n × t matrix over Z q and let v be vector in Z t q . Then there is a natural map from G n to G t that can be informally described as
More precisely, for j = 1, . . . , t, the jth component of (U ·
The set C n ,w acts on n-tuples of secret keys by viewing the n-tuple as a vector in G n .
KDM-security theorem with respect to C n ,w . The following theorem shows that if the DDH assumption holds in the group G then E is n-way KDM-secure with respect to the set C n ,w of affine functions, for any n = n(λ) that is polynomial in the security parameter. Circular security follows since C n ,w contains the constant and selector functions.
Theorem 1. For any n > 0 and for any C n ,w -KDM adversary A, there exists a DDH adversary B (whose running time is about the same as that of A) such that
Note that this bound is independent of n.
Switching to additive notation
Our proof will require some amount of linear algebra, and to make it clearer, we will be using additive notation for the group G; note that G and G k are vector spaces over Z q . To avoid ambiguity, we will use Latin letters for elements of Z q and Greek letters for elements of G. In particular, let G be generated by γ. We will use lower-case letters for scalars and column vectors, and upper-case letters for matrices. We write v · w for the inner product and v × w for the outer product:
When we write the product of a matrix or vector of elements of G, and one of Z q , we mean to use the standard formula. For example, by ρ · s we mean i s i ρ i , which would be written in multiplicative notation as i ρ
It is easily seen that the usual properties of vectors and matrices still hold in this notation.
We write 0 for a column vector of zeros, and 0 k× for a k × matrix of zeros. We write Id i for the identity matrix in Z i×i q . We write · · for augmented matrices. We write Rk i, Z a×b q (resp Rk i, G a×b ) for the set of matrices in Z a×b q (resp G a×b ) with rank i. As a special case, we write GL i (Z q ) for the invertible i × i matrices over Z q .
In additive notation, the system E proceeds as follows:
• Key Generation. Let := 3 log 2 q . Choose a random nonzero vector ψ R ← G and a random vector s in {0, 1} ⊂ Z q . Let δ ← − ψ · s ∈ G and define the public and private keys to be pk := ψ δ ∈ G
1×( +1)
and sk := sγ ∈ G Though formally the secret key is encoded as sk = sγ ∈ G , we will also refer to the decoded form s ∈ {0, 1} as the secret key.
• Encryption. To encrypt a message µ ∈ G, choose a random r R ← Z n q and output the ciphertext row-vector
• Decryption. Let ξ ∈ G 1×( +1) be the ciphertext. To decrypt, compute the inner product:
Decryption works since the vector s 1 is orthogonal to pk.
Since secret keys in our system are encoded as vectors in G , we also need to define the encryption of a vector of group elements. Intuitively, we encrypt each element of the vector separately, then stack the ciphertexts to form a ciphertext matrix. More formally, to encrypt a message µ ∈ G k , choose a random r R ← Z k q and output the ciphertext
We decrypt a ciphertext matrix by rows: µ ← Ξ s 1
A few lemmata
To make the proof flow more smoothly, we present some simple lemmata and facts about E. First, we will show that it is difficult to determine the rank of a matrix of group elements. In particular, it is difficult to distinguish a random matrix of rank r 1 from a random matrix of rank r 2 > r 1 .
Lemma 2 (Matrix DDH)
. Let 1 ≤ r 1 < r 2 ≤ a, b be positive integers, and let A : G a×b → {0, 1} be a polynomial-time algorithm. Write
Then there is a DDH adversary B, running in about the same time as A, such that
Proof. We use a hybrid argument between the r 2 − r 1 + 1 distributions
The algorithm B is given a DDH challenge (α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , α 4 ). It picks a random i R ← [r 1 + 1, r 2 ] and sets
with all the other blocks zero. B then chooses
B now calls A(Φ 2 ) and outputs whatever A outputs. Now if (α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , α 4 ) was drawn from P DDH , then Φ 1 has rank i − 1, and Φ 2 is uniform in Rk i − 1, G a×b . But if (α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , α 4 ) was drawn from R DDH , then Φ 1 has rank i, and Φ 2 is uniform in Rk i, G a×b . The lemma then follows by the standard hybrid argument.
We will also need the following lemma on universal hashing. Recall that a distribution D on a set
Lemma 3 (Simplified left-over hash lemma). Let H be a 2-universal hash family from a set X to a set Y. Then the distribution
Proof. This is an immediate corollary from [15] (see also [23, Theorem 6.21] ).
An expanded system
To make the proofs below more intuitive, we will operate using an expanded version of E, which we will call E 1 . The system E 1 has bigger public keys, but the secret keys and ciphertexts are the same size as in E.
• Key Generation. Let = 3 log 2 q . Choose a random secret key s That is, the secret key is as in the system E, but the public key is a matrix of + 1 public keys from the system E. Note that s is a secret key for all + 1 public keys.
• Encryption. To encrypt a message µ ∈ G k , choose a random matrix R
This is identical to equation (2), except that the outer product is replaced by a matrix product. Informally, we are encrypting 0 k with the ( + 1) public keys for E, summing the resulting cihertexts, and mauling the result to be an encryption of µ.
• Decryption. Decryption is the same as in E. Decryption works since s 1 is in the kernel of Φ, that is, Φ · s 1 = 0.
The following lemma shows that if E 1 is KDM-secure, then so is E.
Lemma 5. For any C n ,w -KDM adversary A against E, there is a DDH-adversary B 1 and a C n ,w -KDM adversary B 2 against E 1 , both running in about the same time as A, such that
Proof. We present the proof as a series of games. Let w i denote the probability that the adversary A wins Game i.
Game 0. Game 0 is identical to the C n ,w -KDM-security game with respect to E defined in Section 2.1. By definition,
Game 1. Game 1 is the same as Game 0, except that the challenger generates public keys and encryptions in a different but equivalent way. Specifically,
• The challenger chooses a random rank-1 matrix Ψ 0
• The challenger chooses n secret keys s i R ← {0, 1} , for i = 1, . . . , n. It creates the corresponding n public keys as follows. For i ∈ [1, n] generate the public key pk i by choosing two random invertible matrices L i R ← GL +1 (Z q ) and R i R ← GL (Z q ) and setting
Note that the matrix Ψ i is a uniformly random rank-1 matrix and is independent of Ψ 0 .
• For each i ∈ [1, n], the challenger chooses a random nonzero row of the public key Φ i , and sends it to the adversary as the E-public-key ϕ i . This row is nonzero, random and orthogonal to s i by construction, so it is a valid public key for s i under E.
• When answering queries, instead of encrypting a message µ with ϕ i under the system E, the challenger encrypts it under E 1 using Φ i as the public key. In other words, it responds with
. Note that Φ i is not a valid public key for E 1 , but only because it has rank 1 instead of rank .
Because Φ i has rank 1, all rows of Φ i are multiples of ϕ i . Therefore, the distributions of ciphertexts r × ϕ i + 0 µ under E and R Φ i + 0 µ in Game 1 are identical. The distributions of public and secret keys are also identical, so the attacker sees the same distribution of messages as in Game 0. As a result, w 1 = w 0 . Game 2. Game 2 is the same as Game 1, except that the challenger chooses Ψ 0 R ← Rk , G ( +1)× so that Φ is a random, valid public key under E 1 . This is the only difference between Games 1 and 2. By Lemma 2, there is a DDH adversary B 1 , running in about the same time as A, such that
At this point the attacker is attacking E 1 , with all but one row of the public keys hidden. Call this process B 2 ; then
as claimed.
Proof of KDM security with respect to C n ,w
We now prove that E 1 is KDM-secure. We will need the following simple facts about E 1 .
• Totality and uniformity. For any secret key s with public key Φ, and any message µ, if a ciphertext Ξ decrypts to µ using s, then Ξ is a possible output of E(Φ, µ), i.e. a valid encryption of µ. Furthermore, all possible outputs of E(Φ, µ) are equally likely.
• Public-key blinding. Let Φ ∈ G ( +1)×( +1) be a public key for some secret key s and let R R ← GL +1 (Z q ) be a random invertible matrix. Then blind-pk(Φ) := R Φ is a uniformly random public key for s. Furthermore, encryption with Φ and with R Φ produce the same distribution of ciphertexts.
• Ciphertext blinding. Let Φ ∈ G ( +1)×( +1) be a public key, and let Ξ
be a random matrix. Then blind-ct(Φ, Ξ) := R Φ + Ξ draws uniformly at random from E(Φ, µ).
• Total blinding. If instead of being a valid public key, Φ is a matrix of full rank + 1, then the output of blind-ct(Φ, Ξ) is uniformly random in G k×( +1) .
• Self-referential encryption. Let sk ∈ G be a secret key with public key Φ. Then γ Id 0 is an encryption of sk with Φ.
• Plaintext homomorphism. Let f ( µ) = A µ + β be an affine function from G n to G m , and let Ξ be an encryption of µ ∈ G n . Then A Ξ + 0 n× β is an encryption of f ( µ).
• Secret-key homomorphism. Let s be a secret key with public key Φ, and let Ξ R ← E(Φ, µ) be an encryption of a message µ ∈ G n . Let f ( x) = A x + b be an invertible affine function from Z q to Z q , and set
Suppose that f ( s) is a valid secret key (i.e. an element of {0, 1} ⊂ Z q ). Then Φ M and extend it to vectors by applying it element-wise. Then for any fixed a ∈ {0, 1} , the function f ( s) := s ⊕ a is an affine function, so we can compute a public key for s ⊕ a from a public key for s.
We now prove the key theorem from which Theorem 1 will follow. Theorem 6. For any C n ,w -KDM-adversary A against E 1 there exists a DDH-adversary B (whose running time is about the same as that of A) such that
Proof. We present this proof as a series of games, and again we let w i denote the probability that the adversary wins Game i.
Game 0. This game is identical to the C n ,w -KDM-security game defined in section 2.1. By definition,
Game 1. Game 1 looks the same as Game 0 to the adversary, but the challenger does not use the secret keys internally. For setup:
• The challenger generates a secret key s R ← {0, 1} with public key Φ, and then "forgets" s. That is, the challenger will not use the value of s for the rest of Game 1.
• The challenger chooses n random vectors a 1 , . . . , a n where a i R ← {0, 1} . It formally sets sk i := ( s ⊕ a i )γ, but it does not know the value of sk i because it has forgotten s.
• For each i ∈ [1, n], the challenger uses the secret-key homomorphism and public-key blinding properties of E 1 to generate a uniformly random public key pk i for sk i from (Φ, a i ).
For brevity, let σ := ( sk 1 | sk 2 | . . . | sk n ) denote the concatenation of the encoded private keys. The challenger does not know the value of σ. To compute E(pk i , f ( σ)) for an affine function f in C n ,w :
• For each j ∈ [1, n], the challenger uses the self-referential encryption property to generate an encryption E(pk j , sk j ). The challenger then uses the secret-key homomorphism property to generate an encryption E(pk i , sk j ).
• The challenger concatenates these to obtain an encryption E(pk i , σ).
• The challenger uses the plaintext homomorphism property to generate an encryption Ξ ← E(pk i , f ( σ)).
• The challenger sends blind-ct(pk i , Ξ) to the adversary.
The distribution of secret keys, public keys and ciphertexts is identical to Game 0, so
Informally, the challenger has used a single public key Φ to generate an entire clique of ciphertexts, without knowing any of their secret keys. It remains to show formally that this gives the adversary no useful information. The remaining games will be identical to Game 1, except that the initial public key Φ will be computed differently.
Game 2. In Game 2, the challenger does:
This is the same procedure used in Game 1, except that now Ψ has rank 1 instead of rank . Lemma 2 tells us that there is a DDH-adversary B, running in about the same time as A, such that
Note that Ψ here may be computed by choosing random nonzero vectors ψ R ← G +1 and r R ← Z q , and setting Ψ ← ψ × r. Thus we see that Φ = ψ × r − r · s is (1/q)-uniform in Rk 1, G ( +1)×( +1) by Corollary 4. Game 3. Since Φ is (1/q)-uniform in Rk 1, G ( +1)×( +1) , we can replace it by a random matrix in Rk 1, G ( +1)×( +1) . Thus, Game 3 is the same as Game 2, except that Φ
Note that in Game 3 the secret s is not used anywhere.
Game 4. Game 4 is the same as Game 3, except that Φ
. By the total blinding property of E 1 , the ciphertexts returned to the adversary are all uniformly random, regardless of the challenger's bit b. Therefore,
On the other hand, by lemma 2, there exists a DDH-adversary B, running in about the same time as A, such that
Combining equations (3) through (8), we find that
This completes the proof of Theorem 6. 
Extensions
Security under the linear assumption. The linear assumption, introduced in [8] , is a weaker assumption than DDH. Weaker versions of the linear assumption were studied in [22, 16] . The proof of Theorem 6 generalizes easily to use these weaker versions of the linear assumption. In particular, to use the r-linear assumption one need only change the value of to := (r + 2) log 2 q . This hurts efficiency, but bases security on a weaker assumption. Note that the DDH assumption is identical to the 1-linear assumption.
Shrinking the ciphertext and private keys. Ciphertexts and private keys in our system contain := 3 log 2 q elements in G where q = |G|. This size of is chosen so that secret keys have sufficient entropy to make the distribution in Corollary 4 be (1/q)-uniform.
Recall that the secret key sk in our system is an encoding of a vector s ∈ {0, 1} , namely sk i := g s i for i = 1, . . . , . The vector s had to be binary for two reasons. First, during decryption we need to recover s from its encoding sk. Second, the proof of Theorem 6 relied on the fact that a vector s ∈ {0, 1} can be mapped to a random vector in {0, 1} using an appropriate random affine map (i.e. by xoring with a known random vector in {0, 1} , which is an affine map).
Let T be the set of -tuples that contains all ! permutations of (1, 2, . . . , ). It is not hard to see that T satisfies the two properties mentioned above: (1) if we encode an -tuple in T by exponentiation as before then decoding can be done efficiently during decryption, and (2) an element s ∈ T can be mapped to a random element in T by the appropriate random affine transformation, namely a random permutation matrix. Hence, the proof of the main theorem (Theorem 1) will go through unchanged if algorithm G chooses s at random in the set T . Since the set T is larger than the set {0, 1} -the former is of size ! while the latter is of size 2 -we can use a smaller value of and still satisfy the entropy bounds of Corollary 4. In particular, it suffices to choose = 4.5 log 2 q log 2 log 2 q so that ! > q
3
This shrinks ciphertexts and private keys by a factor of O(log log q) over the original system.
Conclusions
We presented the first n-circular secure encryption system in the standard model. Security is based on the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption and holds even if the adversary is given affine functions of the secret keys. In addition, we constructed in Appendix A a simple system that is weakly secure, but becomes insecure once a 2-cycle of encryptions is published. An important remaining problem is to improve the performance of our system. Another interesting problem is to construct a semantically secure system that becomes insecure once an n-encryption cycle is published.
We conclude by pointing out that one may be tempted to use a Cramer-Shoup-like construction and simulation [10] to prove n-circular security. After all, a Cramer-Shoup simulator is in possession of all secret keys (needed for responding to decryption queries) and can use them to create an encryption clique to give to the adversary. Unfortunately, we could not get this intuition to work. The problem is that the simulator has to embed the DDH challenge into the circular clique, but it is difficult to do so while creating a valid clique.
A A one-way encryption system that is not 2-circular secure
We show that the notion of one-way security cannot imply one-way security is the presence of encryption cycles. We do so by constructing a secure one-way encryption system that becomes insecure once a 2-cycle of encryptions is published. It is an interesting open problem to design a similar example for semantically secure encryption.
One-way encryption is a weak notion of security. Informally, a system is one-way secure if an attacker given a ciphertext cannot recover the entire plaintext. More precisely, one-way encryption is defined using the following game between a challenger and an adversary A (we assume the plaintext space is a finite set M):
init. The challenger runs algorithm G(λ) to generate a public/private key pair (pk, sk).
The challenger then picks a random message m . We now have the secret keys needed to decrypt any ciphertext encrypted underpk 1 orpk 2 .
Remark: InĒ the second half of the plaintext is transmitted in the clear. One can partially hide it using a one-way function f , as long as the range of f defines private-keys. Simply changeĒ to:
E pk, (m 1 , m 2 ) := E(pk 1 , (m 1 , m 2 )), E(E(pk f (m 2 ) , m 1 ), f (m 2 )) Claims 7 and 8 remain unchanged.
